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WILLS--COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES-DECLARATION-BURDEN OF
PROOF-INSTRUCTIONS--Aquilini,

et al. vs. Chamberlin--No.

13065-Decided February 26, 1934--rOpinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
In a will contest judgment went against the contestants. They
seek a reversal of the judgment. The will was admitted to probate upon
the force of a petition that there were no heirs, and notice was given by
publication to unknown heirs. Ten months later the contestants below,
appearing as heirs, petitioned the County Court to set aside the probate
on the ground of lack of capacity to make the will, and undue influence.
The petition was denied and appealed to the District Court. The will
was sustained.
1. An attorney who draws a will and is paid for his services and
also acknowledges as an attesting witness and who participates as an
attorney in the contest of the will merely as an attorney of record and
not as active in conduct of the case, is not disqualified as a witness to
the will. It only affected his credibility and not his competency.
2. A testator, in publishing the will, does not need to declare the
instrument to be his last will and testament in the words of the statute.
If the testator, by word or deed, clearly indicates that the instru-

ment is his last will and testament, it is sufficient.
3. An instruction that a testator is under no legal obligations to
divide his property among his relatives, and that the very right to make
a will implies and presupposes the making of a will and a disposition
of his property in a manner different from that provided by law, isl
proper.
4. An instruction that influence gained by reason of love and
affection, kindness and appeals to feeling is not undue influence, is a
proper instruction where there is evidence to support it.
5. An instruction that the burden of proof rests upon the contestants is proper where the will has oncd been admitted to probate and
such contest is brought after probate.--Judgment affirmed.

AWARD--CHANGE IN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REOPENING
CONDITION-Boulder Valley Coal Co., et al. vs. Shipka, et al.-

No. 13427-Decided February 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The Industrial Commission awarded to Shipka, claimant, compensation for permanent disability. The District Court affirmed the
award. The claimant received an injury while working for the company
in a coal mine by being caught under falling coal, and filed his claim for
injury but did not include any injury to his back. Hearing was had and
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award made and over a year later further hearing was had and supplemental award made on account of injury to back.
1. Where the evidence supports the Commission's finding of a
changed condition of claimant subsequent to the original award and
there is substantial evidence to sustain a finding that this changed condition was a result of the injury, such award will not be disturbed.--Judgment affirmed.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS--SUFFICIENCY OF ANSWER-DEFECTS UNKNOWN TO TENANT-The

Capitol Amusement Co., et at., vs. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.-No.
13085-Decided February 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
Defendant in error, as landlord, brought suit against plaintiff in
error, as tenant, to recover $6,400.00, ibalance of rent under written
lease. The leased premises were a portion only of a building. A second
amended answer was tendered alleging, among other things, that the
wall, which was a party wall, was negligently constructed and in unsafe
condition and wholly unknown to be so by the tenant at the time the
lease was entered into, and that this wall was no part of the premises
leased by the tenant and that its unsafe condition was either unknown
by the landlord, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have beenr
known, and that on account of its unsafe condition the tenant lost a
sub-tenant, who vacated the premises.
The Court below denied permission to file this second amended
answer and entered judgment against the tenant for the full amount.
1. There is no implied warranty on the part of a lessor that the
premises, as leased, are safe for occupation thereof by the tenant.
2. But there are exceptions to this rule, one being that where the
wall of the building is defective and known to be so by the landlord and
unknown to the tenant at the time of entering into the lease, and if such
condition was not ascertainable by the tenant upon an ordinary or
reasonable inspection of the premises, then it was the duty of the landlord to make such condition known to the tenant and a failure so to
do gives rise to liability on the part of the landlord.
3. Where it appears that the defective wall was no part of the
premises leased to the tenant and that the control of said wall remained
with the landlord, in such case the tenant is under no obligation to inspect the wall. The only obligation, of the tenant is to inspect the
premises covered by the lease. Tenant has the right to assume that the
landlord had properly constructed the wall and was keeping and would
keep same in such condition as to make the premises leased to the tenant
safe for occupancy.
4. The covenant of a tenant to keep the premises in repair does
not extend to such part of the premises as are not under his control.
5. A demise of parcels out of the building leaves the responsibility for what is not demised, upon the landlord. The roof, halls and
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passages not demised, chimneys, eaves and outside walls, remain the
landlord's.
6. The failure of the landlord to discharge the duties imposed
by law, as alleged in the tenant's tendered answer, is sufficient to constitute a defense if proven, and the trial Court was in error in denying
leave to file it on the ground that it did not state a defense.-Judgment
reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY

SUBSEQUENT

TO AWARD-

EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE-Post Printing & Publishing

Co., et al. vs. Erickson, et al.-No. 13409-Decided February
26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Claimant's claim for compensation was affirmed by the District
Court. The claimant was originally awarded compensation for an injury to his right knee. Later, claimant was able to and did return to
work and on the following morning while walking along the sidewalk
on his way to work, but several miles from his place of work, slipped
and fell and broke his right ankle. There was a severe snowstorm at
the time and he was awarded compensation for this latter injury on the
theory that this was a continuation and, practically, a renewal and
aggravation of the injury sustained in the first accident.
1. Any natural development of an industrial injury uninfluenced
by an independent intervening cause, should be attributed to such injury
as part of the loss to be compensated.
2. But upon the happening of a later accident like the one involved here, due to an efficient intervening cause, and not arising out
of or in the course of the employment, the law does not contemplate
that the original compensation shall be increased merely because the
later accident might or would not have happened if the employee had
retained all his former physical powers. It is presumptively for the loss
of these that he was awarded the original compensation.---Judgmrent
reversed.
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION -EMPLOYEE

SHOT

BY

ASSAILANT

WHILE WORKING-NOT WITHIN STATUTE-The Rocky Moun-

tain Fuel Co., et at. vs. Kruzic, et al.-No. 13457-Decided February 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Kruzic, while working for the company, was shot by former employee. There was no evidence that the assault had any connection with
the company. A former employee shot claimant while he was at work
without there being any altercation or any reason whatsoever assigned
in the evidence for the assault. Claimant was allowed compensation by
the Commission and the District Court affirmed the award.
1. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act it is necessary that
the accident originated in a risk peculiar to the employment and that
there was a causal connection between the employer and the accident
or njury.
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2. An accident arises out of an employment when there is a
causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury.
3. The burden rests on the claimant to establish such facts as
were necessary to a legal award, based upon a causal connection between
the accident and the employment. The basis of such facts must be more
than a mere possibility.
4. The test is whether or not there is a causal connection between
the injury and employment, that is, are they so connected that the injury
naturally resulted from the employment?
5. In this case the injury did not arise out of and in the course
of the employment.-Judgment reversed.

SURETY-LIABILITY OF SURETY ON BOND OF RECEIVER FOR ACTS
DONE AS GENERAL MANAGER-The Fidelity & Guaranty Co. of

New York vs. The People for the Use of Milton D. Green, Special
Receiver-No. 13389-Decided February 26, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Judgment was rendered against the surety company below for
$2,500.00 and interest. The surety company had signed George W.
Beck's bond as receiver of the Colorado Pulp and Paper Co. After the
bond was executed the Court appointed receiver as general manager of
the defunct concern.
In said case where the surety company wal not a party this Court
set aside an order of a lower Court of $12,500.00 allowed to Beck as
general manager, but did not set aside the fees of $5,500.00 allowed him
as receiver. He refunded $10,000.00 and this suit was for the balance
of $2,500.00.
1. After the Court had appointed a receiver and ordered him to
give bond in that capacity and after he had taken his oath of office and
after the surety company signed the bond for the faithful performance
of the duties of the receiver, and the Court then creates a new and distinct office of general manager, but no bond in the latter capacity was
either ordered by the Court or given by Beck, such bond as receiver does
not cover Beck's acts as general manager.
2. Where the terms "receiver" and "general manager" are not
used interchangeably in the record but were intended to create two distinct offices, a surety on the bond of the receiver is only liable for the
receiver's acts and is not liable for the acts of the general manager, even
though both offices are held by one person.
3. The liability of the surety is measured by its contract which
was only for the faithful performance of Beck's duties as receiver.Judgmentoreversed.
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PRACTICE-SUPREME COURT-DECISION BY LESS THAN MAJORITY
OF ENTIRE COURT-Dill vs. People-No. 13190-DecidedFeb-

ruary 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
A judgment of conviction in a criminal case was affirmed and motion for rehearing filed and on the day it was denied, defendant moved
that the remittitur be stayed pending further hearing and that the
case be remanded with directions to dismiss the action or for a new trial
on the ground that there are seven justices of this Court, two did not
participate and of the five remaining, two dissented, leaving the majority
opinion supported by only three justices out of the seven.
1. Sec. 7116 of Compiled Laws 1921 which provides that "no
punishment shall be inflicted in any case brought before the Supreme
Court under the provisions of this chapter unless a majority of the justices of said court concur in respect to such punishment" was repealed by
the criminal code which was passed in 1868.-Motion overruled and

remittitur will issue.

APPEAL IN ERROR-APPEAL FROM POLICE MAGISTRATE-TIME TO

FILE BOND AND PAY DOCKET FEE-City of Idaho Springs vs.

Coleman-No. 13185-Decided March 5, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
Coleman et al. sought to enjoin the City of Idaho Springs from
enforcing its Police Court judgments against them and to restrain the
enforcement of a penal ordinance and to cancel the appeal bonds in appeal from said judgments to the County Court. Coleman et al. prevailed below.
1. Injunction will not lie against the judicial enforcement of a
penal code. There may be instances when officials may be enjoined from
the arbitrary enforcement of such an ordinance, but such instances are
not those where the interests or rights of the parties have been judicially
determined after a hearing.
2. The city of Idaho Springs had the right to regulate and tax
filling stations by ordinance. This was an occupation tax.
3. Where the defendants in the Police Court failed to prosecute
an appeal, in the manner provided by statute for appeal, they cannot
obtain relief in equity. The first statutory provision for appeal from
police magistrate in cities under 25,000 is that within five days he shall
make sufficient bond, conditioned that he will satisfy such judgment as
may be rendered upon appeal and shall within ten days pay the necessary fee for docketing the case in the County Court. These are mandatory regulations and a failure to comply therewith is fatal to appeal.-

Judgment reversed.
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